crates.io phishing attempt

Earlier this week, an npm supply chain attack.

It’s turn for crates.io, the main public repository for Rust crates (packages).

The phishing e-mail looks like this:

A phishing e-mail: Important: Breach notification regarding crates.io  Hi, BurntSushi! We recently discovered that an unauthorized actor had compromised the crates.io infrastructure and accessed a limited amount of user information. The attacker's access was revoked, and we are currently reviewing our security posture. We are currently drafting a blog post to outline the timeline and the steps we took to mitigate this. In the meantime, we strongly suggest you to rotate your login info by signing in here to our internal SSO, which is a temporary fix to ensure that the attacker cannot modify any packages published by you.
Andrew Gallant on BlueSky

And it leads to a GitHub login page that looks like this:

A fake GitHub sign-in page.
Barre on GitHub

Several maintainers received it — the issue is being discussed on GitHub.

The crates.io team has acknowledged the attack and said they’d see if they can do something about it.

No compromised packages have been identified as of yet (Sep 12, 14:10 UTC).

Important links:

(JavaScript is required to see this. Or maybe my stuff broke)

Here's another article just for you:

A dynamic linker murder mystery

I write a ton of articles about rust. And in those articles, the main focus is about writing Rust code that compiles. Once it compiles, well, we’re basically in the clear! Especially if it compiles to a single executable, that’s made up entirely of Rust code.

That works great for short tutorials, or one-off explorations.

Unfortunately, “in the real world”, our code often has to share the stage with other code. And Rust is great at that. Compiling Go code to a static library, for example, is relatively finnicky. It insists on being built with GCC (and no other compiler), and linked with GNU ld (and no other linker).